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INTRODUCTION
In Morocco’s Western High Atlas Mountains, Berber agropastoralists are
oblivious to the ideological debate over land tenure occurring in the
rangeland development community. Berber producers of sheep and goats use a
continuum of tenure institutions, from private ownership, to communal control,
to uncontrolled, open range. Far from being ideological opposites, these
different types of land tenure are complementary tools. This complementarity
contradicts the neat ideological lines drawn between pro- and anti-commons
schools of thought in the range development community.
My purpose is twofold. First, I review briefly the current controversy over
land tenure in the range development community. Then, arguing against a
popularized paradigm that proposes that private tenure of scarce resources is
necessarily more efficient than communal control, I present a case study of
forage-land tenure in a High Atlas valley. Using examples of tenure in this
valley, I argue retroductively in favour of a more comprehensive paradigm of
rangeland tenure that considers both benefits and costs as factors of the
appropriateness of private or communal tenure.
REVIEW OF LAND TENURE ARGUMENTS
Hardin (1968) in his essay, "The Tragedy of the Commons", reasoned that
communal resources were subject to inevitable degradation. Using a pastoral
analogy, he argued that a herder who abused his pasture by increasing his
flock size beyond the pasture’s capacity would gain all the benefit of his
private decision in the form of the extra animals. But he would share the
reduction in forage availability with all other herders on a communal pasture.
Given this lack of incentives, no rational herder would restrain his herd
size. Communal pastures, under Hardin’s paradigm, are inevitably overgrazed
and degraded if animal numbers have reached the productive capacity of the
land, and can only be limited by uncoerced human decision.
Far from "exorcising" Adam Smith’s spirit (as Hardin professed to do) his
argument seemed to mirror Smith’s 18th century argument against sharecropping
(metayage). Under sharecropping, the producer had little incentive to invest
in the land’s productivity, because the landlord shared in, and therefore
diluted, any profit from the investment. Under sharecropping, Smith reasoned,
producers would invest little in the improvement of agriculture.
To paraphrase Hardin himself, Hardin did not assert that traditionally managed
commons were invariably flawed. But, by his choice of the word "Commons" in
a pastoral analogy, he has contributed to a tendency of thought that condemns
all communal tenure. This tendency (or ideology) of agricultural development
is eager to privatize communal rangelands, under the banner of "the tragedy
3of the commons."
Gilles and Jamtgaard (1982) responded to this attack on communal institutions.
They argued that under low productivity and spatial variability of rainfall,
which are common characteristics of rangelands, extensive animal production
was most efficient on large blocks of land. Large blocks of land could be
managed either as private ranches (if most of the pastoralists depending on
the range were excluded from it) or by maintaining communal ownership. Gilles
and Jamtgaard chose to support the second more equitable option. They then
discussed cases of communal pastures (in the Andes, the Alps and in Africa)
where communal tenure did not inevitably lead to range degradation or where
degradation was preceded by a weakening of traditional, communal management.
Artz (1986) clarified the debate over the commons by distinguishing between
free and open, or uncontrolled range and true commons. He argued that under
free and open range, with no social mechanisms of range control, Hardin’s
model applied: herders had no incentives to restrain herd size and the range
would become degraded. State control of pastures, ineffectual in many
developing countries, was essentially the same as free and open use, and led
to the same result of range degradation. Under true communal tenure, however,
management as well as use was communal, and decisions could be enforced to
prevent range degradation.
Behnke (1985) further clarified the debate by applying property rights theory
to understanding ownership of rangelands. He considered both the value of the
land’s product and the cost of policing it from trespassers as factors that
determined the optimum level of tenure. The model he advocated predicted that
more valuable land would be held in more concentrated forms of tenure (i.e.
toward the private end of the tenure continuum) while less valuable land, not
justifying the investment needed for policing, would be held in more diffuse
forms of tenure. This is not a trivial observation for rangelands, which,
because of their low potential for improvement, often cannot profitably absorb
investments, regardless of the type of tenure under which they are held.
TENURE OF FORAGE LANDS IN THE IMENANE VALLEY
In this section, I argue in support of Behnke’s model of the tenure of forage-
producing lands. You, the development planner, I say, should follow Behnke’s
rather that Hardin’s model of pastoral development. You should, in the
interests of developing countries and pastoral producers, use your influence
to allow privatization of forage land when its potential value, in spite of
policing costs, is high enough to encourage producers to invest in the land’s
productivity. At the same time, you should encourage communal tenure to
continue where poor land cannot profitably absorb investment and where larger
user groups can more efficiently bear the costs of policing relative to the
4benefits of production.
As evidence for my argument, I present a case study of land tenure
institutions in a high mountain valley in the Western High Atlas where Berbers
practice sedentary, irrigated agriculture and transhumant production of sheep
and goats.3 The type of production on forage-producing lands varies from
irrigated, seeded perennial pastures and hay meadows, to relatively
unproductive, dryland ranges. More specific (i.e. private) forms of tenure
are associated with the smaller, more intensively managed fields, while more
diffuse (i.e. communal) forms govern the larger, more extensive pastures and
ranges (Table 1).
Tenure and Levels of Investment
Land tenure in the Imenane varies from private to village-communal to multi-
village-communal, to tribal-communal, to essentially free and open range. At
the most specific level, families privately own small terraced meadows. One
village communally owns a large irrigated pasture. One group of 3 villages
communally owns another, equally large irrigated pasture, while a second group
of 3 villages communally controls a dry mountain range. Certain villages of
the historic Rherheya tribal confederation communally control a large
watershed (Oukaimeden) that is legally owned by the State. Finally at the
most diffuse level of tenure is the greater part of the Imenane watershed.
It is owned by the State and used exclusively by the tribesmen of the Imenane,
but it is essentially uncontrolled. This last category nearly fits Artz’s
definition of free and open range.
The level of investment practiced on forage-producing lands also varies.
Most of the unimproved mountain range is merely policed very casually to
prevent outsiders from entering, but rights holders can graze their flocks
at any time of year, weather permitting. The tribal commons and the multi-
village, communal-mountain range are policed both to restrict access to
rights holders, and to limit season of use. This extra
restriction requires a higher investment in policing. The multi-village
and the one-village communal meadows are policed to restrict access to
3 To simplify discussion, I describe only forage-producing
lands used by local Berbers within the Imenane Valley. Winter
ranges 50 km away on the Haouz Plains (Mendes & Narjisse) are not
described because they are not directly controlled by Imenane
Berbers, who therefore cannot easily change the tenure
institutions governing these lands. Also, in order to simplify
the discussion of the marginal utility of forage used at
different seasons and for different purposes, I describe only
forage-producing lands exploited by small ruminants and ignore
those used almost exclusively by cattle.
5rights holders and to limit season of use; the communal entities also pay
for irrigation. Only the privately owned meadows and pastures receive the
investment of periodic revegetation. Like the communal pastures,
Table 1. Land tenure and types of production on land
exploited by small ruminants in the upper Imenane Valley.
Land Type Orders
tenure of of size
institutions production
private irrig crop terraces, m2 x 100
meadows and pastures
village irrigated slope hectares
commons pasture
multi- irrigated slope hectares
village pasture
commons
nearby km2
mountain range
tribal high altitude km2
commons mountain range
tribal other near and far km2 x 10
open range mountain ranges
they are also protected from improper season of use and irrigated. Table
2 illustrates the activities invested in lands held under successively more
concentrated levels of tenure.
Table 2 suggests an association between more specific levels of ownership
and higher levels of investment. The problem for us is: which is cause
and which is effect? With no other information given, supporters of
Hardin’s model might argue that producers invest more in irrigated
terraces precisely because the land is privately owned. They might argue
that if all land in the valley were privately owned, it could all receive
Table 2. Land tenure and levels of investment in land exploited by small
ruminants in the upper Imenane Valley.
6Land Tenure Levels of Investment
institution policing only labour & cash inputs
private users defined season of use irrigation periodic
and policed policed revege-
tation
village users defined season of use irrigation
commons and policed policed
multi-village users defined season of use irrigation
commons and policed policed
multi-village users defined season of use
commons and policed policed
tribal users defined season of use
commons and policed policed
tribal users defined
open range but little
policing
more investment and be more productive.
To support Behnke’s model, that producers change land tenure to match the
land’s ability to profitably absorb investment, I must describe other
qualities of the fields and rangelands in question. If these qualities can
also explain the land’s potential as a profitable investment, then we will
have an alternative, retroductive argument to privatizing all land. To do
this, I will follow Behnke’s model and compare the benefits and costs of
owning different types of forage-producing land in the Imenane.
Benefits and Costs of Land Ownership
According to Behnke’s model, producers can invest in the private control of
a piece of land only when the benefits of ownership are greater than the
costs of protecting or policing ownership. Benefits of land ownership are
due to the productive potential of the land itself (due to its soil, water
availability and climate) and to the marginal value of forage harvested
from the land at different seasons for different production purposes.
Tenure and land productivity potential. Mountain soils vary in their
productivity, from fine-textured alluvium in the valley bottoms to stony,
coarse-textured colluvium on steep mountain slopes. Because precipitation
is low, irrigation is needed for cultivation, but low stream flow and the
7expense of raising water over steep terrain restricts irrigation to the
valley bottoms and lower slopes. In some high altitude rangelands, where
peat soils and abundant water might allow cultivation, a short growing
season and severe winters limit the value of the land for cultivated crops.
Table 3 shows the levels of tenure and the productive potential
(subjectively rated) of the different forage producing lands in the
Imenane.
Generally, land with physical properties that we would expect to result in
a high productive potential are held under more specific forms of land
tenure. I suggest that over time producers have privatized the more
productive lands, leaving less productive lands under communal or no
control. This suggestion is consistent with Miller’s recounting (1984)
of the oral history of a neighbouring valley. The process of
privatization is apparently continuing: the communal owners of the
irrigated village commons shown in Table 3 were debating in 1985 whether to
parcelize and privatize the pasture (Mohamed Mahdi, personal communication,
1985).
Two anomalies to the general relationship of increasing specificity of
tenure with increasing productive potential appear on Table 3. First,
the multi-village range is held communally in spite of its poor
productive potential. Second, the tribal commons is held communally rather
than privately in spite of its relatively good potential. I will
Table 3. Land tenure and productivity potential (subjectively rated) of
land exploited by small ruminants in the upper Imenane Valley.
Land tenure Type of Productivity
institutions production Potential Reasons
private irrigated meadows highest level fields;
and pastures alluvial soils;
irrigation water
village commons irrigated slope high fine-textured soil;
pasture irrigation water
multi-village irrigated slope high fine-textured soil;
commons pasture irrigation water
multi-village nearby poor coarse soils;
commons mountain range warm (South-facing)
8tribal commons high altitude good some organic soils
mountain range and natural
irrigation; cold
tribal other near and generally coarse soils; cold
open range far mountain poor (North-facing)
ranges
use
the former case to illustrate the importance of the marginal value of
forage to land value and return to the latter anomaly in the discussion of
policing costs.
Tenure and the marginal value of forage. The multi-village communal range
in question seems indistinguishable from the rest of the watershed’s
uncontrolled rangeland. However, forage produced on it has a higher
marginal value to flock owners because the forage is available in winter.
The range is directly adjacent to the three villages that manage it and has
a southern exposure. Because of the southern exposure, it is warm and
snow-free in winter when the opposite side of the valley is cold and
snowbound. Because winter is the limiting season for livestock production
in the Atlas, and most flock mortality occurs at this time forage that is
available in winter has a higher marginal value than forage available only
in summer. As a result, villagers find it profitable to invest the effort
in controlling this relatively unproductive range in a communal management
scheme.
In general, forage-producing land in the Imenane is owned at more
concentrated levels of tenure as the marginal value of its forage crop
increases. Thus, the private, terraced fields are used to produce hay for
emergency winter feed, in case the flock becomes snowbound. These fields
also produce winter grazing to supplement the lactating flock in order to
reduce lamb and kid mortality. These winter forages have a very high
marginal utility. The two other village-level communal pastures provide
forage of less marginal value, for mid-summer use, when men are busy with
the barley harvest and not available to shepherd the flocks to distant
pastures. Otherwise, in spring and summer, forage is less limiting in the
mountains and therefore has a lower marginal value. Villagers do not seem
to find it worthwhile to invest effort into controlling spring and summer
pastures.
However, the high-altitude tribal commons appears to be an anomaly, both
because of its relatively good production potential (Table 3) and because
of the high marginal value that its forage could have if it were stored and
used in winter. It is now used as a late-summer-fall breeding range.
9(Mendes & Narjisse). Granted, cold climate limits its value as cropland
and deep snow usually prevents winter grazing. But the common’s
subirrigated peat-soiled meadows are much more productive than the more
usual, dryland mountain ranges. Why is this tribal commons not sub-divided
and privatized, so that private owners could harvest and carry privately
owned hay to their villages for use in winter, when its marginal value
would be higher?
And, for that matter, why is the multi-village range, producing winter
forage of high marginal value, not subdivided and privatized? Each family
that now uses it could then exploit its own small range with assurance of
forage supply. The objection of Gilles and Jamtgaard (1982) that spatially
variable precipitation makes small areas of range risky sources of forage,
does not apply here. Precipitation in the Atlas comes mostly in frontal,
rather than convectional, storms. Rainfall is therefore widespread rather
than localized. Forage productivity is low, but more or less even within
a vegetation community, so that the range could theoretically be subdivided
among its current communal users, with each flock owner continuing to
receive the same relative amount of forage.
But this argument for privatization ignores the cost of policing land as a
disincentive to ownership.
Tenure and policing costs. "To be thus is nothing," Macbeth tells us,
"but to be safely thus." Privately owned land is worthless if owners
cannot protect its product for their sole use. Worthlessness is not an
absolute but a relative value: as the cost of defending property rights
increases, the benefits of ownership must also rise, or the investment in
ownership will be unprofitable, and no rational producer will invest. The
cost of policing is determined by the land’s remoteness, its size and the
type of barrier that protects it. I discuss here four ways, in order of
decreasing cost, of protecting productive lands in the Imenane from
trespassers. Small fields can be fenced. Nearby rangelands - too large to
fence - can be observed and intruders on it challenged. Less easily seen
rangelands can be protected by severe threats of intertribal warfare or by
religious or legal sanctions. Finally, very remote ranges can be protected
by natural boundaries. Several of these protective measures might police
use of a particular piece of land.
Privately owned, irrigated fields are usually protected from flock rights -
of way by stone walls topped with natural briar fences. In winter, when
flocks graze inside the fenced irrigated perimeter, each family devotes
several shepherds to ensure that its flock does not stray into fields owned
by other families. Private owners can afford these labour-intensive
activities only when the protected property is small and relatively
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The larger, irrigated pastures and the multi-village communal range are not
fenced, but their boundaries are clearly marked, and pastures are mostly
within sight of the villages in which the owners live. Trespassers can be
easily seen, challenged and punished. In policing, communal rather than
private ownership has the advantage of many eyes, because everyone in the
group has an interest in challenging intruders.
The far borders of the multi-village communal range, which are several
kilometres distant, are not policed easily by sight, but high mountains and
wide stretches of very poor pastures create natural boundaries. The cost-
effectiveness of these natural boundaries is illustrated by the lack of
communal ranges in the downstream villages of the Imenane. Producers in
these villages claim to envy the winter-forage supply provided by the
multi-village communal range, but they explain that such a protected
commons would be impossible to defend in mid-valley. There, natural
borders are lower, and intruders could enter from all sides.
The high-altitude tribal commons is located in a neighbouring watershed,
out of sight, and on the frontier of a neighbouring powerful tribe.
Policing exclusive rights to it would have entailed the high cost of
intertribal war; but the two neighbouring tribes wisely compromised and
share its use. As long as the risk of intertribal conflict remains, any
individual tribesman’s use rights are more easily defended by the united
tribe, acting communally, than by the user acting privately. Communal
rights here are also defended by religious and legal sanctions, though the
effectiveness of the legal sanctions, at least, depend on observing the
land and catching intruders. Here again, communal groups, with their many
interested eyes, have the advantage over private owners in policing.
Finally, the tribal open range - the greatest part of the area of the
Imenane watershed - is protected only by natural borders. While these are
forbidding and effective along the upper watershed divides, generally they
are ineffective as obstacles to flocks. Producers invest little effort,
communally or privately, in trying to exclusively hold this hard-to-defend
range. Shepherds (in the same tribe) from different valleys have the right
to graze these ranges; it would be hard to prevent them from doing so even
if they had no rights. Such is the case with shepherds from other tribes
who occasionally graze into Rherheya territory where they have no rights.
In the Imenane Valley, a continuum of land tenure institutions - from
private, to communal, to open range - governs land exploited by small
ruminants. The land itself varies widely in productive potential, in the
marginal value of forage harvested from it and in the ease with which it
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can be protected from trespassers.
We saw that users invested more into land held under more specific tenure.
Doubting that land tenure was solely the cause, and level of investment
solely the effect, we looked at alternate explanations for differences in
tenure. We found that in the upper Imenane, more specific tenure is
associated with higher productive potential of the land, with higher
marginal value of forage and with lower costs of protecting ownership. I
reasoned that, while private tenure has the advantage of security of
investment in small, highly productive fields, communal tenure has
advantages for policing large, less productive ranges.
It would be absurd to argue that ecological and economic factors are the
only determinants of land tenure in the Imenane, in the Western High Atlas
or elsewhere. Legal and traditional precedent and the positive feedback to
incentives for investment in private land theorized by Adam Smith two
centuries ago obviously play roles in the way land is held and developed.
But it is equally misleading to ignore the ecological and economic
constraints to investing in extensive rangelands.
DISCUSSION
Policy makers use paradigms to make sense of myriads of details in order to
act purposefully. But, to be simple enough to be understood, models must
be gross simplifications: imperfect descriptions of the "real world".
Nevertheless planners choose to use that paradigm which helps them to act
coherently, replacing it when a more useful one is found.
Hardin’s model of the "tragedy of the commons" has performed a service for
range development policy, explaining the inefficiencies of diffuse
ownership of those resources that can profitably absorb investment. But
most rangeland in the world serves as range precisely because of its low
potential productivity. Such land cannot be profitably improved regardless
of the tenure by which it is held.
The more comprehensive alternative, which I advocate, is Behnke’s paradigm,
which considers both the benefits and the costs of land ownership. Using
Behnke’s model, we will encourage investment by privatization, when it is
ecologically and economically feasible. At the same time we will encourage
less intensive ecological manipulation through control over season of use
and by restricting access to marginal rangelands when privatization is not
feasible. Finally, we must bring under State control, or ignore, those
ranges that are subject to degradation but are too remote or unproductive
to justify private or communal control.
Specifically, in the Imenane, I believe that a current Eaux et Forets
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(Forest Service) policy governing use of State lands could be adapted to
fit new techniques in agroforestry. Currently, farmers can secure long-
term usufruct of State land ("Forest-land") for dryland cultivation of
wheat or barley. Usufruct is guaranteed by the State Forester if the user
cultivates the field every year.
However, in the poor soils of the upper Imenane, these dryland cereal
fields are often unproductive. During my two-year visit, many hillslope
fields were abandoned because of low rainfall. Farmers may find it more
economical to produce fodder shrubs or trees on these lands with new agro-
forestry techniques. Fodder shrubs protrude above the snow except after
the most severe storms, and could provide critical winter forage to
chronically starved sheep and goats.
I suggest, therefore, that the State grant long-term usufruct of "Forest
lands" on the perimeter of villages to local farmers. Families should be
given rights to blocks of land small enough to be planted within an autumn
(the correct transplanting season for nursery stock in this cold, winter-
precipitation region). Long-term usufruct could be guaranteed to families
that maintained a certain density of live plantings on the land. I believe
that Eaux et Forets would be acting consistently with its mandate to
protect the mountain watershed if it allowed families to control as many
blocks of land as they could plant and maintain, year after year. And, I
believe that farmers would find it economical to transplant small nearby
patches of forage shrubs in order to have one more source of winter forage
for their flocks.
Private usufruct of improved ranges is not, however, a reasonable option
for most of the watershed. Nursery stock, which must be transported into
the valley by Eaux et Forets, or grown by farmers themselves, will be
expensive in farmers’ labour, even if its cash price is subsidized by the
State. The newly transplanted stock must be irrigated by hand in late
autumn until the first heavy rains come. Plantings, even on land within
sight of the village, will progress slowly.
For those lands within sight of the village that have southern exposures
but which are not yet claimed for private usufruct I suggest communal
village control. Village councils could be given the same kind of usufruct
rights over these lands as private farmers receive for dryland cultivation
on Forestlands. This seems to be similar to a former traditional system of
range control. Currently, with no control on their use, these ranges are
overgrazed early in spring. With a legally enforceable guarantee that no
flock would exploit these village commons out of turn, village councils
could set them aside as deferred winter ranges.
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For ranges that lie between two or three villages and that would be
difficult for one village alone to police, I recommend a multi-village
commons. Families in every member village would have an inventive to
respect, and coerce others to respect, the opening and closing dates of
grazing.
Finally, much marginal land in the Imenane is far from sight and accessible
to flocks only on long summer days when forage is not limiting. Eaux et
Forets cannot expect farmers, either individually or communally, to invest
scarce labour into policing access to these lands. Because the State also
lacks the resources to effectively police these lands, it has no realistic
option but to leave them uncontrolled and free and open range. I believe
(or hope) that distance and difficulty of access will protect these Alpine
ecosystems until the State has the administrative resources to defend them
from overgrazing.
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